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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LORENZO H. HUBBARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900128-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less 
than first degree felonies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did Officer Smith have a reasonable suspicion to stop 
the automobile in which Mr. Hubbard was a passenger? 
2. Did the subsequent detention exceed its proper scope? 
3. Were the warrantless searches valid as a result of 
Mr. Hubbard's consent? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Findings of fact are reversed when they are clearly in 
error, and conclusions of law are reversed when they are incorrect. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326f 327 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 108 
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will 
be relied upon, and are contained in either Appendix 1 or the body 
of the brief: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Hubbard was charged with two counts of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (R. 6-7). One of those counts 
was bound over by the magistrate (T. 42). 
On November 27, 1989, Mr. Hubbard filed a motion to 
suppress evidence seized by the police and a supporting memorandum 
of points and authorities (R. 37-44). The hearing on this motion 
was held on December 21, 1989, after which hearing the court denied 
the motion to suppress (T. 1-39). A copy of the trial court's order 
denying the motion to suppress (R. 62-63) is included in Appendix 2 
to this brief. 
On February 2, 1990, Mr. Hubbard entered a conditional no 
contest plea to one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann 
§ 58-37-8 (R. 66-72). 
Acting pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988), the trial court accepted the conditional plea, which was 
conditioned on the appeal of the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Hubbard's motion to suppress (R. 66-72; T. 40-48). The trial 
court sentenced Mr. Hubbard to a term of zero to five years in the 
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Utah State Prison and stayed the sentence pending this appeal 
(R. 73). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the afternoon on July 9, 1989, police officer Bruce 
"B.L." Smith stopped a car because he remembered the license plate 
number of the car from a previous "attempt to locate" (T. 3-5). The 
term was explained as follows: 
THE COURT: I have one question: What is an 
attempt to locate? 
THE WITNESS: If somebody breaks a window and 
somebody sees a car leaving the scene, they call 
in and say: Somebody just broke a window. And 
the complaint taker would say: Did you see 
them? Yeah, they left in a brown Subaru, south 
on State from 9th South. 
THE COURT: You take that as meaning it's 
been associated with some possible crime and 
that's why you're attempting to locate? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
(T. 21). 
The attempt to locate had been issued some seventy days 
earlier, on May 1, 1989 (T. 13), and was no longer on the dispatch 
computer, apparently because attempts to locate are deleted from the 
computer seventy-two hours after they are entered (T. 15). The 
attempt to locate specified only the make and license number of the 
vehicle and that the charge involved was theft (T. 13, 22). 
When Officer Smith first thought he recognized the license 
plate number, the car was parked at the Rose Bar, but before Officer 
Smith could find out from the papers in his binder the status of the 
attempt to locate, the car left the Rose Bar (T. 4, 14). 
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As Officer Smith followed the car, he called for a backup 
and then made an "investigatory stop" "to determine who was in the 
vehicle" (T. 4). After he successfully stopped the car, Officer 
Smith called dispatch to have them pull the case relating to the 
attempt to locate, but dispatch had no information (T. 5). Officer 
Smith explained the lack of information by noting that attempts to 
locate are routinely deleted from the dispatch computer three days 
after they are entered (the attempt to locate was over two months 
old) (T. 15). 
Officer Smith asked the driver of the car, Henry 
Overstreet, for his driver's license, which he did not have, and 
took Mr. Hubbard's license and the other information gathered back 
to his car to run a registration and warrants check (T. 16). 
Officer Smith discovered that Mr. Overstreet's license was suspended 
(T. 5-6). Officer Smith arrested Mr. Overstreet, searched him, and 
charged him with possession of contraband found during the search 
(T. 6). Officer Smith gave Mr. Overstreet to another officer for 
transportation to the jail (T. 6-7). 
Officer Smith approached Mr. Hubbard, whom Officer Smith 
knew was the registered owner of the car (T. 23), who was being 
held1 outside of the car, apparently near the open passenger door 
(T. 17). He indicated that he did not know if Mr. Hubbard had 
1
 The transcript is unclear as to whether Mr. Hubbard was 
being detained by actual physical contact with the police. See 
T. 17 ("Q. And you were holding him outside the car or inside the 
car? A. Outside the car."). 
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exited the car on his own or at the request of one of the other 
officers or at Officer Smith's request (T. 20). Officer Smith asked 
Mr. Hubbard if he had any narcotics, stolen property or weapons in 
the car or on his person. (T. 7-8). Mr. Hubbard indicated that he 
had a small knife on his person and consented to be frisked (T. 9, 
17) .2 
Officer Smith testified that his purpose in frisking 
Mr. Hubbard was not to search for weapons, because Officer Smith was 
not concerned with danger from Mr. Hubbard: 
At that time, as far as I was concerned, 
there was no danger as to Mr. Hubbard. The 
investigatory stop was to determine who was in 
the vehicle at that time, so that information 
could be forwarded to the detective to follow up 
on his case; if the case was still open; if he 
needed to show pictures, I could give them the 
name of three individuals in that car. 
There was no — I felt that there was no 
danger for a pat down for weapons at that time. 
(T. 17). Officer Smith frisked Mr. Hubbard and found the knife 
(T. 9). 
Officer Smith noticed a wallet sitting on the passenger 
seat and asked Mr. Hubbard's permission to search the car (T. 18), 
2
 Officer Smith's trial testimony is somewhat confusing. 
He testified that he asked Mr. Hubbard if he had any "dope, 
narcotics, stolen property, or weapons" in the car, and Mr. Hubbard 
responded first with a sweeping hand motion (T. 7-8). Officer Smith 
testified that he then asked Mr. Hubbard if that meant yes, and 
Mr. Hubbard indicated "Yeah." (T. 8). Later testimony clarifies 
that in using the hand motion and saying "yeah", Mr. Hubbard was not 
admitting that he had contraband but was consenting to the search. 
Accord R. 38 (motion to suppress) and R. 48-49 (preliminary hearing 
transcript). See also T. 18 (Officer Smith testified that at the 
time he began searching the wallet, he had no probable cause to 
suspect that he would find contraband (T. 18). 
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and Mr, Hubbard made a sweeping motion with his hand (T. 8)• When 
Officer Smith asked if that meant yes, Mr. Hubbard said, "Yeah." 
(T. 8-9). Officer Smith testified that he picked up a wallet from 
the seat of the car (T. 9-10). 
At the time that Officer Smith picked up the wallet, 
Mr. Hubbard was not under arrest (T. 18). Officer Smith indicated 
that he had no probable cause to believe that Mr. Hubbard was 
carrying drugs, contraband or weapons, although Officer Smith was 
familiar with Mr. Hubbard's criminal and drug history (T. 18-19). 
When Officer Smith opened the wallet, he found an empty 
plastic bag, and told Mr. Hubbard it was empty, to which, according 
to the officer, Mr. Hubbard responded, "They all better be." 
(T. 10). Officer Smith then found two containers containing 
suspicious substances inside the wallet (T. 10). 
After Officer Smith arrested Mr. Hubbard, he did a complete 
inventory search of the car (T. 20) . 
At the time that Officer Smith was speaking with 
Mr. Hubbard about searching the vehicle, there was at least one and 
perhaps three other officers standing nearby (T. 6-7, 10). No guns 
were drawn (T. 11). The stop and search were made near 200 East and 
3190 South and there were other cars but no pedestrians nearby 
(T. 11). Officer Smith apparently knew one of the other passengers 
in the car and had also had prior dealings with Mr. Hubbard and was 
corrected when he addressed Mr. Hubbard by the wrong name (T. 15). 
Lorenzo Hubbard testified that he was in his 1975 Buick 
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Electra on July 9, when Officer Smith pulled the car over 
(T. 23-24). Officer Smith pulled the car over, asked the driver, 
Mr. Overstreet, for identification and registration, and then 
recognized the passenger in the back seat of the car (T. 24). 
Officer Smith also recognized Mr. Hubbard and called him by the 
wrong name, but Mr. Hubbard corrected him, "Bill, you know, you know 
me." Officer Smith replied, "Sonny." (T. 25). After Officer Smith 
asked Mr. Overstreet for identification, he asked Mr. Hubbard for 
identification, and Mr. Hubbard pulled his driver's license from his 
wallet and gave the license to Officer Smith (T. 25). Officer Smith 
took the license back to his car and Mr. Hubbard put his wallet on 
the seat of the car (T. 25). 
Five or ten minutes later, Officer Smith returned to the 
car and informed Mr. Overstreet that he had a warrant for his 
arrest, asked him to get out of the car and handcuffed him (T. 25). 
The backup police officer took Mr. Overstreet to a police car, and 
that process took five or ten minutes (T. 26). 
After Mr. Overstreet was arrested, Officer Smith approached 
the car and said, "If you're dirty you better have time to clean 
up," and directed Mr. Hubbard to exit the car (T. 26). Mr. Hubbard 
and the back seat passenger exited the car (T. 26). Officer Smith 
informed Mr. Hubbard that there was a "make up" on the car for 
theft, and Mr. Hubbard told the officer, "Lee and them is already in 
jail." (T. 26). Officer Smith asked permission to search the two 
gentlemen, received Mr. Hubbard's consent to search him, and frisked 
Mr. Hubbard (T. 27). Officer Smith then asked whose wallet it was, 
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and Mr. Hubbard claimed it as his (T. 27, 28). 
While Officer Smith was holding the wallet, he asked 
permission to search the car, and Mr. Hubbard told him to go ahead 
(T. 27) . Officer Smith then searched Mr. Hubbard's wallet (T. 27). 
Officer Smith neither requested nor obtained Mr. Hubbard's consent 
to search the wallet (T. 27). Mr. Hubbard did not tell Officer 
Smith not to search the wallet (T. 29). 
When Officer Smith asked Mr. Hubbard what the first piece 
of plastic was, Mr. Hubbard indicated, "I don't know, but it better 
be nothing." (T. 28). Officer Smith later found the controlled 
substance (T. 28). Officer Smith asked for and received consent to 
search the trunk of the car, and another officer arrested 
Mr. Hubbard and took him away (T. 28). 
Between the time that the car was stopped and Mr. Hubbard 
was handcuffed, about forty five minutes passed (T. 29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The initial investigatory stop was not justified by a 
reasonable suspicion held by Officer Smith because the attempt to 
locate was over seventy days old, no longer in the dispatch 
computer, based on hearsay, and vague. 
Assuming arguendo that the initial stop was justified, the 
subsequent detention exceeded its proper scope. After Officer Smith 
determined that Mr. Hubbard was the registered owner of the car and 
did not have a warrant out on him, he had no basis to further detain 
Mr. Hubbard. Officer Smith had no probable cause to search 
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Mr. Hubbard, his wallet, or his car. 
Mr. Hubbard's consent to the search of his person and the 
search of his car were not given voluntarily. 
Even if Mr. Hubbard's consent to the search of his person 
and the search of his car were given voluntarily, they were obtained 
through the exploitation of the illegal detention and/or stop. 
Assuming arguendo that the consent given to search 
Mr. Hubbard's person and car were voluntary and sufficiently 
independent from the illegal detention and/or stop, Officer Smith 
exceeded the scope of the consents in searching Mr. Hubbard's wallet 
and the containers therein. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the 
motion to suppress and remand the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OFFICER SMITH HAD 
NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
JUSTIFY THE INITIAL STOP. 
In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep 78 (Utah 1990), this Court set forth the 
rudimentary principles governing traffic stops: 
The protective shield of the fourth 
amendment applies when an officer stops an 
automobile on the highway and detains its 
occupants. A police officer may constitutionally 
stop a citizen on two alternative grounds. 
First, the stop "could be based on specific, 
articulable facts which, together with rational 
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inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude [defendant] had 
committed or was about to commit a crime." 
Second, the police officer can "stop an 
automobile for a traffic violation committed in 
the officer's presence." 
Id. at 883 (brackets by the Court, citations omitted). 
The trial court's ruling that Officer Smith's initial stop 
was justified (R. 63) was clear error. 
The attempt to locate relied on by Officer Hubbard was over 
seventy days old on the day of Mr. Hubbard's arrest and was based on 
hearsay from an unidentified declarant (T. 13, 21). The attempt to 
locate apparently had not been reactivated since it was deleted from 
the dispatch computer two months before the stop (T. 15) and 
specified only the make and license number of the vehicle and that 
the vehicle allegedly had been involved in a theft of unspecified 
property (T. 13, 22). 
Officer Smith indicated that it was his own unique policy 
to maintain a clipboard with old attempts to locate (T. 13). 
When compared with the facts of State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 
718 (Utah 1985)(per curiam), the facts in the instant case do not 
support a finding of a reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Hubbard's 
car. In Swanigan, a police officer noticed two suspects in the 
vicinity of a crime on the night of the crime, and the dispatch 
published an attempt to locate based on the officer's observations. 
Id. at 719. When a different officer stopped the two suspects, who 
were still in the vicinity of the crime, the court found that he had 
no reasonable suspicion to do so. Id. 
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In the instant case, the incident involved in the attempt 
to locate was two months old (T. 13) and was not tied to a location 
near Mr. Hubbard's car at the time of the stop (T. 22). While the 
attempt to locate in Swanigan was issued on the basis of the 
observations of an identified police officer and a specific crime, 
the attempt to locate in the instant case was never tied to a 
declarant or a specific crime—as Officer Smith explained to the 
trial court, the attempt to locate could have been based on a 
telephone call made to the police by anyone (T. 21). See State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 648-651 (Utah 1989) (Terry stop based on police 
broadcast is proper if officer issuing the broadcast has reasonable 
suspicion to justify the stop). 
The facts of this case do not demonstrate a reasonable 
suspicion when compared with the facts of cases in which attempts to 
locate formed the basis of a reasonable suspicion. See State v. 
Torres, 508 P.2d 534 (Utah 1973) (officer properly stopped a suspect 
described in a ten-minute-old attempt to locate, involving a 
fifteen-minute-old crime); and State v. Dixon, 531 P.2d 1301 (Utah 
1975) (officer properly stopped a suspect fitting the description 
broadcast in an attempt to locate; the crime, attempt to locate, and 
arrest all occurred on the same night). 
II. 
THE DETENTION EXCEEDED 
ITS PROPER SCOPE. 
As this Court explained in State v. Robinson and Towers, 
Case No. 890053-CA (Utah App. July 18, 1990), a case involving a 
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traffic violation stop, even when automobile stops are valid, the 
subsequent detention must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of 
serious criminal activity. Id. at 6. See also State v. Schlosser, 
774 P.2d 1132, 1135-1136 (Utah 1989) (when detention exceeds its 
proper scope, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
is violated). 
The trial court made no finding relating to the propriety 
of the detention following the initial stop3 and clearly erred in 
failing to recognize the lack of a reasonable suspicion to support 
the forty-five-minute detention of Mr. Hubbard (T.29). 
Assuming arguendo that the initial stop was proper, after 
Officer Smith determined that there was no information available 
concerning the attempt to locate (T. 15), that there were no 
warrants out on Mr. Hubbard (T. 16), and that Mr. Hubbard was the 
registered owner of the car (T. 23), he had no basis to further 
detain Mr. Hubbard. 
Officer Smith testified that when he detained and searched 
Mr. Hubbard, he had no probable cause to believe that he would find 
weapons, drugs, or contraband, and indicated that Mr. Hubbard was 
not under arrest (T. 17-19) . 
While Officer Smith articulated no basis for the detention 
following the warrants check, the officers in Robinson and Towers 
did. The officers there attempted to justify the detention of 
3
 But see State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 and n.l 
(Utah App. 1990) (explaining that thorough written findings of fact 
facilitate appellate review of rulings on motions to suppress). 
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Robinson and Towers on several factors—nervous behavior, evasive 
conversations, lack of clothing to support the claim that the 
gentlemen were on their way to a two-week trip to the Wind Rivers, 
and failure of the gentlemen to produce proof that they had 
permission to be driving the van, which they did not own. Id, 
at 6. Nonetheless, this Court found the proffered bases for the 
stop inadequate, "In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly 
erred in its finding that the troopers had the reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity necessary to justify their continued detention 
and questioning of Robinson and Towers once the warning citation was 
given and the purposes for the initial stop had been accomplished. 
Defendants7 detention after that point was, therefore, a violation 
of their fourth amendment rights." Id. at 8. 
In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the court 
rejected as a basis for a post-traffic violation detention the 
furtive movements of a passenger in the car and the driver's 
approaching the arresting officer outside of the car with 
registration and license in hand. Id. at 1134-1136. The officer in 
Schlosser, like Officer Smith in the instant case, had "no probable 
cause, and no articulable suspicion either that his safety was in 
danger or that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity. He 
cited no safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he sought 
only to investigate the possibility that defendants were engaged in 
illegal activity." Id. at 1137. 
Just as the officer's inadequate proffer of articulable 
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion justifying the detention 
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failed in Robinson and Towers and Schlosser, Officer Smith's 
complete lack of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion 
to justify the detention of Mr. Hubbard renders it illegal under 
Fourth Amendment standards. 
III. 
THE PROSECUTION FAILED 
TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE CONSENT WAS 
VOLUNTARY AND INDEPENDENT FROM 
THE ILLEGAL DETENTION. 
As this Court explained in State v. Robinson and Towers, 
Case No. 890053-CA (Utah App. July 18f 1990), 
Two factors determine whether consent to a search 
is lawfully obtained following police action that 
violates the fourth amendment, such as the 
unlawful detention here: (1) the consent must be 
voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not 
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Arroyo , 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
Both tests must be met in order for evidence 
obtained in searches following police illegality 
to be admissible. Id. 
Slip opinion at 9. 
Although the trial court found that Mr. Hubbard gave 
voluntary consent to the search of his person, his car, and his 
wallet (T. 63), the trial court did not specify the factors leading 
to the conclusion that Mr. Hubbard's consent was voluntary, and made 
no findings relating to the taint of the prior illegality on that 
consent (the trial court did not recognize any illegality in Officer 
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Smith's conduct).4 
More problematic is the trial court's apparent shifting of 
the burden of proof on the issue of consent, 
I can't say, Counsel, that this was coerced. I 
just don't see enough evidence that this was a 
coersive [sic] atmosphere in giving this 
consent. It seems to me it was a voluntary 
concept [sic]. 
(T. 37-38). 
As this Court noted in Robinson and Towers, 
[A] prosecutor attempting to prove voluntary 
consent after illegal police action "'has a much 
heavier burden to satisfy than when proving 
consent to search' which does not follow police 
misconduct." 
Id. at 9, n. 7, quoting State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, 
quoting United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th 
Cir. 1984). 
A. THE CONSENT WAS NOT PROVEN VOLUNTARY. 
As this Court explained in the Robinson and Towers case, 
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary 
or was the product of duress or coercion, 
express or implied, is a question of fact to 
be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances. While knowledge of the right 
to refuse consent is one factor to be taken 
into account, the government need not 
4
 See footnote 3, supra. 
The hearing on the motion to suppress occurred on 
December 21, 1989, after this Court's opinion in State v. Arroyo, 
770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. Feb. 15, 1989) was issued and prior to the 
issuance of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in that case on 
June 28, 1990. 
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establish such knowledge as the sine qua non 
of effective consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 
(1973). In examining all the surrounding 
circumstances to determine if in fact the consent 
to search was coerced, a court must take into 
account both the details of police conduct and 
the characteristics of the accused, Arroyo, 137 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, which include "subtly 
coercive police questions, as well as the 
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the 
person who consents." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
229. It is the State's burden to prove that a 
consent to search was voluntary." 
Slip opinion at 9. 
In this case, Officer Smith stopped Mr. Hubbard's car for 
no apparent reason.5 After noting his acquaintance with 
Mr. Hubbard, the officer confiscated Mr. Hubbard's identification 
and returned to the patrol car (T. 15, 16). Officer Smith then 
searched and arrested the driver of the car, Mr. Overstreet (T. 6). 
Mr. Hubbard was then asked out of his car and held there while two 
or three officers looked on, and Officer Smith questioned him 
concerning possession of drugs, weapons and stolen property (T. 6-8, 
10, 20-26). Officer Smith then asked Mr. Hubbard if he could frisk 
him, and did so (T. 9, 18). This detention lasted some forty-five 
minutes (T. 29). 
The lack of drawn guns and the fact that the detention 
occurred in daylight (T. 11) do not distract from the coercive 
5
 Officer Smith did not indicate that he told Mr. Hubbard 
about the attempt to locate at all; Mr. Hubbard indicated that 
Officer Smith told him about it after Mr. Overstreet was arrested 
and Mr. Hubbard and the other passengers were asked out of the car 
(T. 26). 
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nature of the detention. The prosecution did not demonstrate any 
knowledge on the part of Mr. Hubbard that he had the right to refuse 
the illegal detention and search, nor did the prosecution 
demonstrate a subjective state of mind on the part of Mr. Hubbard 
indicating that he felt at ease with the police. 
These facts compare with those in Robinson and Towers, in 
which this Court determined for the first time on appeal that the 
consent given was not voluntary, stating: 
Here, the defendants were first questioned 
about their right to possession of the van during 
the brief, initially valid traffic stop. Once 
the legal basis for that stop had ended, after a 
short period of detention, they were nonetheless 
not free to leave. They were detained and 
questioned about matters other than the traffic 
violation on the side of the interstate by two 
armed police officers with apparent, though 
false, authority to do so, then ordered by one 
trooper to remain at the van and await his 
return. They complied with his commands. Next, 
they were questioned about whether they were 
carrying any contraband and asked to consent to a 
search of the vehicle. There is no evidence that 
Robinson was aware or was informed that he did 
not have to accede to the trooper's request. At 
that time, it was apparent that the defendants 
would be kept in that custodial environment until 
the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the 
contents of the van, particularly the area under 
the bed. In light of the troopers' questioning 
and conduct, the coercive atmosphere at the time, 
and the other surrounding circumstances, we 
conclude that the State has not borne its burden 
of proving that Robinson's consent to search the 
vehicle was voluntary. 
Id. at 10. 
In short, in this case, as in Robinson and Towers, the 
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving voluntary consent, 
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and in finding inadequate evidence of coercion, the trial court 
improperly shifted the burden of proof, and clearly erred. 
B. THE CONSENT WAS TAINTED BY THE ILLEGAL DETENTION 
AND/OR STOP. 
As the court explained in State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13 (Utah 1990): 
The basis for the second part of the 
two-part analysis is found in the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Son v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which stated that a 
trial court must determine in such a case 
"'whether, granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint.,H 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting 
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). The 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been 
extended to invalidate consents which, despite 
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation 
of a prior police illegality. 
Id. at 16. 
The court further explained the factors to be considered in 
determining whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating 
that the consent was not tainted by preceding illegalities: whether 
warnings of rights were given, the temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the consent, intervening circumstances,6 and the 
purpose and flagrancy of the illegality. Id. at 18 n. 4. 
6
 For examples of intervening circumstances, see e.g. 
Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (the 
defendant was allowed to consult with his companion in his car); 
Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (the defendant 
was admonished that his consent was not mandated). 
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The prosecution presented no evidence that Mr. Hubbard was 
informed of his right to refuse consent to the search of his wallet, 
his car, or his person. 
The illegalities during the forty-five-minute detention and 
the consent were temporally proximate. Officer Smith's conduct 
moved from one illegality (improper stop (T. 4)) to the next 
(detention of Mr. Hubbard after warrants check indicated no reason 
to hold Mr. Hubbard (T. 16)), to the next (asking him out of his car 
(T. 20, 26)), to the next (asking him about possessing drugs, guns, 
stolen property (T. 7-8)), to the next (searching his person without 
any reasonable suspicion or probable cause (T.17)), to seeing the 
wallet (T. 17-18), to obtaining permission to search the car, and 
then searching the wallet (T. 18). 
The prosecution presented no evidence of any intervening 
circumstances, see n. 6, supra, between the illegalities and the 
consent. 
The prosecution presented no evidence of any purpose 
whatsoever for Officer Smith's misconduct. Mr. Hubbard was not 
under arrest until after Officer Smith searched his wallet (T. 18). 
Officer Smith perceived no threat of weapons or danger from 
Mr. Hubbard (T. 17). Officer Smith had no probable cause to believe 
that he would find any weapons, drugs or other contraband (T. 18). 
Whether Officer Smith's purpose was to randomly fish for evidence of 
crime, to satisfy his curiosity, to exercise his police power, or to 
harass the occupants of Mr. Hubbard's car, his purpose was 
flagrantly improper. 
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In short, the State failed to carry its burden of 
demonstrating that Mr. Hubbard's consent was not tainted by Officer 
Smith's illegal conduct. See State v. Arroyo. 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 
13, 15-17 and n. 4 (Utah 1990) (giving additional examples of and 
authority for this mode of analysis). 
IV. 
OFFICER SMITH EXCEEDED 
THE SCOPE OF CONSENT. 
Assuming arguendo that Mr. Hubbard's consent was voluntary 
and not the result of Officer Smith's illegal conduct, a further 
issue remains: Did Officer Smith's searches exceed the scope of 
that consent? As this Court explained in State v. Marshall. 791 
P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990), cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 
1990), 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents 
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited 
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by 
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent 
itself Any police activity that transcends 
the actual scope of the consent given encroaches 
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect." 
United States v. Gav. 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th 
Cir., 1985); See e.g. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 
193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of consent exceeded 
when police asked to "look around" the house, 
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, 
drawers, boxes and closed containers). 
Id. at 888. 
The trial court made no finding resolving the dispute 
between Officer Smith's testimony that the wallet was in the car 
when he asked permission to search the car and Mr. Hubbard's 
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testimony that the wallet was in Officer Smith's hand when he asked 
permission to search the car. See footnote 3, supra. If that 
finding were that the wallet was in Officer Smith's hand at the time 
he asked permission to search the car, it would seem clear that 
Officer Smith exceeded the scope of the consent to search the car 
when he searched the wallet. Marshall at 888. 
Assuming arguendo that Officer Smith was accurate in his 
indication that the wallet was in the car when he obtained 
permission to search the car, the search was nonetheless invalid. 
Officer Smith's requesting permission to search the car was 
deceptive, vitiating any consent given. Before asking permission to 
search the car, Officer Smith saw the wallet (T. 18) and asked 
Mr. Hubbard whose it was (T. 27, 28). If Officer Smith wanted to 
search the wallet, he should have asked permission to do so, rather 
than requesting permission to search the car. Compare State v. 
Lorenzo, 743 S.W.2d 529, 531-532 (Mo. App. 1987) (when officer 
gained permission to look inside van, permission did not extend to 
permit search of van and contents; "Consent to search cannot be 
considered freely and intelligently given when a police officer 
misleads the person from whom consent is sought as to his 
intentions."). See also State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah 
App. 1990) (citing People v. Thiret. 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984), 
and summarizing it, "scope of consent exceeded when police asked to 
'look around' the house, then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, 
drawers, boxes and closed containers."). 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the trial court's order denying 
the motion to suppress the evidence seized in violation of 
Mr. Hubbard's right against unreasonable search and seizure and 
remand this case for a new trial excluding the illegally seized 
evidence. ~ 
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APPENDIX 1 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LORENZO HUBBARD, 
ORDER DENYING SUPPRESSION 
OF EVIDENCE 
Case No. CR89-1185 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Defendant 
On December 21, 1989, the above entitled matter came on 
for hearing in response to the defendant's motion to suppress. The 
defense submitted a memorandum of points and authorities, testimony 
was heard from the arresting officer, B.L. Smith, and from the 
defendant. Argument was then heard from counsel for the State and 
counsel for the defendant. Having considered all of the above, the 
Court then found there was consent to search the car, the person of 
the defendant and the defendant's wallet; that the consent was 
voluntarily given; that the investigatory stop was justified. 
Ceil**-- /-&sr-?"d 
COGG: 
ORDER DENYING SUPPRESSION 
OF EVIDENCE 
Case No. CR89-1185 
Page 2 
Therefore the Court declines to suppress any and all evidence that 
the State proposes to use for trial, and most particularly the 
controlled substance found in the defendant's wallet. 
SIGNED this 
una in tne aerenaant's wallet. 
(D day of "v\x*v . l<OjQ 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEI^  ^ 
Judge, Third District Court 
G0063 
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1 IT TOOK PLACE AT 2 O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON. THERE WERE 
2 CARS PASSING, THERE WERE PROBABLY PEOPLE IN THE HOUSES, OUT 
3 ON THE STREET. THIS IS HARDLY THE KIND OF COERSIVE 
4 ATMOSPHERE THE COURTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WHEN THEY TALK 
5 ABOUT VOLUNTARINESS. THERE WAS NO THREATENING ATMOSPHERE, 
6 THERE WAS NOT A MOB OF POLICE OFFICERS; POSSIBLY TWO OR 
7 THREE. NONE OF THEM HAD THEIR GUNS DRAWN. THERE WAS 
8 NOTHING HERE THAT OFFICIATES THE VOLUNTARY CONCEPT. 
9 MR. LOYD'S ARGUMENT IS THAT THE ATTEMPT TO 
10 LOCATE WAS OUTDATED. BUT THE OFFICER HAS TESTIFIED IT WAS 
11 NOT CANCELLED, SO IT WAS STILL IN THAT SENSE — IT WAS 
12 STILL ACTIVE AND CERTAINLY GAVE HIM PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
13 INDEED AN OBLIGATION TO STOP THAT VEHICLE AND INVESTIGATE 
14 THE STATUS OF THAT. 
15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, THE COURT IS GOING TO 
16 WORK BACKWARDS. I THINK THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION AND SO 
17 FINDS THERE WAS A CONSENT TO SEARCH THE AUTOMOBILE AND 
18 PERSON. THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THAT INVITATION 
19 WOULD EXTEND, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, TO THE 
20 WALLET THAT WAS TAKEN FROM THE PERSON, OR THE DEFENDANT, 
21 AND PLACED IN THE CAR. SO I THINK THAT UNDER THESE 
22 CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS CONSENT. I CAN'T SAY, COUNSEL, 
23 THAT THIS WAS COERCED. I JUST DON'T SEE ENOUGH EVIDENCE 
24 THAT THIS WAS A COERSIVE ATMOSPHERE IN GIVING THIS CONSENT. 
25 IT SEEMS TO ME IT WAS A VOLUNTARY CONCEPT. THE QUESTION I 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 SUPPOSE IS WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS AN ILLEGAL STOP IN THE 
2 FIRST PLACE. 
3 THIS ATTEMPT TO LOCATE MAY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT 
4 OLD. I CAN'T SAY IT WAS OUT DATED. I CAN'T SAY THAT WHAT 
5 AN OFFICER MAY HAVE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO STOP, AT LEAST 
6 UNDER THE POLICIES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. OF COURSE 
7 HE'S NOT BOUND BY THOSE. AND THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY 
8 THOSE. BUT IT WOULD SEEM TO ME HE WAS ENTITLED TO STOP IT 
9 UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SO WHAT I BELIEVE THIS BOILS 
10 DOWN TO IS THE COURT IS GOING TO DENY THE MOTION TO 
11 SUPPRESS. 
12 WOULD YOU PREPARE THE ORDER, MISS BYRNE? 
13 MR. BYRNE: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
15 MR. LOYD: WOULD THIS BE THE APPROPRIATE TIME 
16 TO SET A COURT DATE, TRIAL DATE? 
17 THE COURT: CERTAINLY. YOU DON'T HAVE A TRIAL 
18 DATE YET IN THIS CASE? 
19 THE CLERK: JANUARY 22ND. 
20 MR. BYRNE: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T HAVE MY 
21 CALENDAR WITH ME. I KNOW THAT I'M VERY BUSY AT THE START 
22 OF JANUARY. AS FAR AS YOU KNOW, JANUARY 22ND IS ALL RIGHT. 
23 IF THE COURT WILL GIVE ME LEAVE TO COME BACK IF I HAVE A 
24 PROBLEM — 
25 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, ARE YOU GOING TO YOUR 
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